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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL NMSS
INSPECTION PROCEDURE 87103
INSPECTION OF MATERIAL LICENSEES
INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT OR BANKRUPTCY FILING
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:  MC 1301
87103-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVES *
01.01This inspection procedure is applicable to the inspection of
incidents that occur at nuclear materials facilities and for those
cases where the NRC is concerned that material may not be properly
controlled, such as when a licensee files for bankruptcy.
According to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection
Manual Chapter 1300, "Incident Response Actions," NRC management
must determine the need to dispatch one or more regional inspectors
to conduct a special inspection following occurrence of an
incident, either immediately following notification, or before the
next routine inspection.  This procedure is intended for use in
such special inspections.  The incidents to be inspected under this
procedure include those that are considered serious enough to
warrant a special inspection to determine causes and corrective
actions, but are not of such a nature as to require an Incident
Investigation Team (IIT) or an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT).
Typically, the procedure will be used in response to
misadministrations, overexposures, losses or releases of
significant quantities of radioactive materials, and situations
where the NRC is concerned that material may be abandoned, such as
in cases where the licensee has filed for bankruptcy, but it is not
limited to these type of incidents.  In instances where the
material has been abandoned, the guidance in Policy and Guidance
Directive PG 9-12, “Reviewing Efforts to Dispose of Licensed
Material and Requesting DOE Assistance,” and Inspection Manual
Chapter 1303, “Requesting Emergency Acceptance of Radioactive
Material by DOE,” should be followed.
Most of this Inspection Procedure places emphasis on regional*
inspectors and regional management.  Nonetheless, headquarters*
inspectors or staff may also be involved in these inspections due*
to the nature of some type of licensee activities, like uranium*
recovery facilities. *
01.02The objective of the procedure is to assist headquarters or*
regional inspectors in analyzing the sequence of events leading to*
the incident, and the conditions that existed at the time these87103 - 2 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
events occurred.  This analysis should lead to the identification
of contributing factors and root causes, and to the formulation of
corrective actions to prevent recurrence.  The primary emphasis of
the inspection is safety, not compliance.  Issues of compliance are
addressed after all safety issues and program weaknesses are
identified and clearly understood.  This procedure is also an
essential step in ensuring that the NMSS/IMNS database contains *
complete and accurate event information.
01.03 The steps presented in the procedure should be followed in
the order they are presented; some of the steps may be repeated in
alternating fashion as data accumulates and hypotheses are refined.
Experience shows that accidents generally have multiple
contributing factors that are interconnected in complex ways.
Therefore, a disciplined, organized, and thorough approach to the
inspection are essential.  Organization and correlation of the
findings should start early in the inspection.  Charts should be
used if the data is complex.  The initial organization of the data
will necessarily be sketchy and incomplete, but this early start
will help direct the inspection and also help identify areas where
data is lacking or is inconsistent.
87103-02 DEFINITIONS
02.01 Cause.  The action or condition that led to the occurrence of
the incident.  Causes are labeled, according to their proximity to
the incident, as direct, contributing, or root causes.
02.02 Direct Cause.  This is the event or failure that led directly
to the incident, without any additional intervening action or
failure.  An example is a technician improperly measuring a dose in
a dose calibrator.  A possible direct cause for the incorrect dose
is improper setting of the radionuclide or energy selection dial on
the calibrator.
02.03 Contributing Cause.  This is a cause that does not
necessarily lead to an incident, but it does make the incident more
probable.  In the example of the dose calibrator mentioned in the
Direct Cause definition, a contributing cause may have been a
radionuclide or energy selection dial with illegible markings at
the various settings.  This does not in itself necessarily lead to
errors in measuring doses, since a trained and attentive technician
may know from experience where the settings are, without reference
to the markings.  However, the fact that the markings are not
legible makes it much easier to make an error, and hence may be a
contributing factor, or cause, when an error does occur. 
02.04 Root Cause.  This is the cause whose existence establishes
the conditions that allow contributing causes to develop and which,
in turn, increases the probability of the occurrence of an
incident.  In the example of the calibrator mentioned in the Direct
Cause definition, a root cause may be an organization with a poor
maintenance program.  The poor maintenance program may be due to an
unqualified maintenance manager who fails to set routine
maintenance schedules, set maintenance priorities, or respond to
maintenance requests.  In this case, the root cause may be theIssue Date: 11/03/00 - 3 - 87103
presence of the unqualified manager, which results in a poor
maintenance program.
87103-03 INSPECTION REQUIREMENT
03.01 Conduct an inspection to:  1) determine the causes of the
incident and the corrective actions, taken or planned, to prevent
recurrence; or 2) address the accountability and control and health
and safety issues associated with a licensee filing for bankruptcy
or instances where material may have been abandoned.
87103-04 GENERAL GUIDANCE
04.01 Pre-Inspection Notifications.  NRC regional management and*
staff involvement  early in the incident assessment is critical in*
determining the scope of the proposed inspection activities and*
future actions.  Contact should be made with State and local*
authorities, and public affair representatives to coordinate*
follow-up actions.  As soon as the decision is made to inspect the*
incident, notify the licensee's management that an inspection of
the incident is to be conducted.  When notifying the licensee, make
sure that the incident has been brought under control and that
there are no ongoing safety issues.  If there are, immediately
notify regional management of the situation.  Request that the
licensee preserve any physical evidence connected with the
incident, if that is possible.  Request in advance that the*
licensee be prepared to submit the necessary documents at the*
initial licensee meeting. *
04.02Pre-Inspection Preparations.  Prepare all materials and
documents that may be needed during the inspection, based on your
knowledge of the nature of the incident, types of exposures, and
the availability of technical support and equipment at the site.
04.03Initial Licensee Meeting.  Meet with the licensee's
management as soon as possible upon reaching the site.  Explain the
purpose of the inspection, the techniques to be used in conducting
the inspection, the scope of the work, and the expected duration.
04.04Facility Inspections.  A tour of the facility or a specific*
area should be performed at the beginning of the inspection since*
it may be necessary for the NRC inspector to observe proper control*
of licensed material affected by the incident.  If possible have*
licensee representatives guide the tour, then arrange personnel*
interviews when the tour is completed.  Inspect equipment, tools,*
work areas, storage areas, and anything else directly or indirectly
involved in the incident. 
04.05Interviews.  Interview all personnel directly or indirectly
involved in the incident, as well as all levels of management whose
area of responsibility is in any way connected with the persons87103 - 4 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
involved in the incident or who have any responsibility for the
facilities or equipment connected with the incident.
04.06 Documentation.  Obtain copies, or originals if copies are not
available, of all documentation that may be needed in the
inspection.  Ensure that proprietary materials are appropriately
safeguarded and original material handled carefully and returned at
the end of the inspection.  In any case where documentation
supports or is needed to support an inspection finding, the
inspector must make a copy of the document and include it as an
attachment to the inspection report.  The licensee should be
advised of each document that will be included as part of the
report.
04.07 Review of the Data.  Review the notes of the interviews and
tours, and the relevant documents.  Establish a time line for the
incident.  If the data does not produce a coherent, internally
consistent narrative, repeat interviews, tours, and document
reviews until all inconsistencies and information gaps are
addressed.
04.08 Establishing Causes.  Once satisfied that all the relevant
information has been obtained, ordered in proper temporal and
logical sequence, and verified to be consistent, technically
correct, and coherent, identify contributing factors and root
causes.  Correlate these findings with weaknesses in the licensee's
program, and formulate ideas on what the appropriate corrective
actions to prevent recurrence should be.  Compare with the
licensee's corrective actions and evaluate their adequacy.  If the *
licensee's corrective actions are determined to be acceptable, a *
commitment and schedule for implementation should be made by the *
licensee and submitted to the cognizant NRC region. *
04.09 Licensee Briefings.  Meet periodically with the licensee's
management and key personnel involved in the incident.  Review the
sequence of events and specify the suspected causes.  Provide the
licensee with opportunities to modify or correct the data, sequence
of events, or conclusions.  Obtain further data if warranted by the
discussions, and make corrections to the conclusions, as necessary.
04.10 Event Analysis Data.  Make sure that as much as possible of
the data needed by NMSS/IMNS is available to you before the exit *
meeting (see Section 5.12).
04.11 Exit Meeting.  Prepare notes summarizing the sequence of
events and the conclusions.  Identify possible items of
noncompliance.  Meet with the licensee's management and present
these findings.  
04.12 Post Inspection Actions.  Any follow-up actions that the *
inspector takes on a reported incident should be summarized in
writing, discussed with his/her appropriate NRC supervisor, and
maintained in an official regional file (the docket file for an
incident involving a licensee).  A formal report of the results of
the inspection should be prepared and distributed in accordance
with the standard distribution list (see Inspection Manual Chapter *Issue Date: 11/03/00 - 5 - 87103
(MC) 0610, "Inspection Reports").  Each incident must be evaluated*
to determine if it meets the criteria for an Abnormal Occurrence
Report (see Management Directive (MD) 8.1, "Abnormal Occurrence*
Reporting Procedure"). *
*
Inspectors will also meet with regional licensing staff when any*
pertinent licensing issues are raised during the inspection, when*
inspection findings impact on any licensing actions, or to give*
feedback on how the licensee has addressed special license*
amendments or recent licensing actions.  This meeting will be*
documented in the inspection record.  *
*
Additionally, in some instances, inspection findings will warrant*
communication with NRC Enforcement staff, Office of Investigations*
staff, State liaison staff, or other Federal agencies with whom NRC*
has Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).  In the latter case, ensure*
that the exchange of information is made in accordance with the*
appropriate MOU. *
*
The inspector will ensure that inspection findings are clearly*
documented and reported to the licensee as appropriate.  The*
inspector will also follow the requirements of MC 0620, "Inspection*
Documents and Records," regarding notifying the licensee that*
information that is retained by the inspector is subject to public*
disclosure and giving the licensee the opportunity to request*
withholding it (see MC 0620, Section 04.06.b.). *
87103-05DETAILED GUIDANCE
05.01Pre-Inspection Notifications.  As soon as the decision is
made to travel to the licensee's facility to conduct an inspection,
call the licensee to notify them of the upcoming inspection.   Make
sure to speak with a licensee official who is high enough in the
organization to ensure prompt execution of any necessary
arrangements.  During this call, provide the licensee with the
following information:  
a. Expected time of arrival at the licensee's facility.   
b. Purpose of the inspection.
c. Expected duration of the inspection.
d. Request a meeting with appropriate staff, including the
responsible licensee management, very soon after the
anticipated arrival time. 
e. Identify individuals to be interviewed.  Have the licensee
make arrangements for these persons to be available when
needed, and ensure that the radiation safety officer (RSO)
will be available.  If the licensee uses a consultant,
request that the consultant be present during part of the
inspection.  If that is not possible, then arrangements
should be made for him/her to be available by telephone
during a specified time period.87103 - 6 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
f. Specify a time and date on which the exit meeting is expected
to be held.  Make it clear that this is a rough estimate
that depends on the course of the inspection.  Also make it
clear that the highest level of facility management (e.g.,
the company president, CEO, or plant manager) is expected at
this meeting, including the RSO.
g. Request that copies or, if not possible, originals of all
documents that may be needed during the inspection be
prepared and ready following the initial meeting.  These
documents usually include data on surveys and various
radiological measurements, log books, calibration and
traceability records, training and qualification records, an
organization chart, procedures, and any other documents that
may seem relevant (see also Section 05.07).  If in doubt
about the utility of a document, request it anyway.
Emphasize the importance of providing all the requested
documents as soon as you arrive at the facility.
h. Request that a knowledgeable person be available to accompany
you on a tour of the facility.
i. Request that physical evidence connected with the incident be
preserved, if possible.  Examples of physical evidence may *
include:  a survey instrument that gave erroneous readings or *
malfunctioned (useful in determining why the instrument
malfunctioned); a dosimeter that gave a much higher than
expected dose reading (may be tested to determine if the
dosimeter is defective); contamination smears and air sample
filters (may be recounted or subjected to more sophisticated
analysis, if necessary); instrument settings as they were
found after the incident, etc.
j. Make sure that access is available to any part of the
licensee's facility that is involved in any way, directly or
indirectly, with the incident.  If there appear to be any
difficulties, stress to the licensee that unescorted access *
must be arranged, escorted if need be.  Notify regional
management immediately of any potential difficulties in
gaining access to areas or information.  If a certain level
of security clearance is required and you do not have that
clearance, or if you do not have the required unescorted
access training, immediately inform regional management and
request guidance.
05.02 Pre-Inspection Preparations.  Before leaving on the
inspection, make sure to take all documents, calculators, computer
disks, references, radiation safety equipments, etc., that may be *
needed.  A portable computer may be very useful, as would a small
hand-held tape recorder to record observations and ideas (not
interviews).  Arrange for regional or Headquarters personnel to
provide technical assistance over the telephone, in case
information that is needed, is not available at the site, or if it *
is desirable to run a computer program on a regional computer, to
check calculations.  When preparing for the inspection, consider
taking at least the following items:  Issue Date: 11/03/00 - 7 - 87103
a. Writing pads, notebooks, and other stationary needed to
record interviews, data, and findings, and to perform
calculations and draw charts.
b.  Calculator.
c. Computer discs with programs to perform various radiological*
calculations, if available, and if the licensee can provide
the necessary computer, or a portable computer with the
necessary software.  Word processing software may be helpful
if you can type at a reasonably rapid pace.
d. References, handbooks, etc., that contain the basic
radiological equations and the values of frequently used
constants.  For example, if the incident involved external
radiation exposures, equations to convert fluence to dose may
be needed.  A variety of source geometries should be
anticipated, such as a point, line, disk, sphere, or*
cylinder, etc.  Quantities normally needed in such*
calculations include attenuation and energy absorption
coefficients at various energies, densities of a variety of
materials, buildup factors, organ depths, and so on.  Skin
dose calculations require skin dose equations applicable to
a variety of source geometries.  Internal dose calculations
will require organ masses, intake retention functions, intake
to committed dose conversion factors for organs, and so on.
In addition to the technical references, regulatory
references should also be taken, including at least the parts
of Chapter I (The parts of Title 10 that pertain to the NRC)
that apply to the licensee, as well as other regulations that
may apply, such as transportation regulations for
transportation-related incidents.
e. Appropriate radiation safety equipment (instrument,*
dosimetry) to ensure areas are safely controlled. *
05.03Initial Licensee Meeting.  Upon arrival at the site, meet*
with licensee management.  If a sufficiently high level of
management commensurate with the severity of the incident is not
present, explain the situation to the licensee, terminate the
meeting, and contact regional management immediately.  Await
instructions from the region before proceeding.  The importance of
this step is that it is necessary to ensure that a licensee
representative who has the authority to make changes in the program
has first-hand knowledge of the inspection and its findings.
During the initial meeting, present the following items briefly,
but clearly:  
a. The purpose of the inspection.
b. The expected duration of the inspection.
c. The level of support you expect from the licensee.
Request a brief description of the incident including the names of
the personnel directly involved.  Request that the licensee make87103 - 8 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
available the personnel to be interviewed.  Request that the
interviews start immediately after the meeting.  Set an approximate
time and date for the exit meeting.  Make it clear that this is
tentative and may change, depending on the progress of the
inspection.  Request that the licensee provide you with the
documents you requested during the pre-inspection telephone
conversation described in section 04.01.  Find out the name of the
person to accompany you on the tours.  Request the name of a
management person to contact in case you experience difficulties or
you do not get the necessary level of support.
05.04 Interviews.  Interview everyone connected in any way with the
incident, either directly or indirectly.  The interviews should
follow a widening circle, from the small number of people directly
involved, to an increasing number of people less and less directly
involved.  Persons directly involved are those whose actions
directly led to the incident, such as, for example the person who
dropped the syringe, or the person who was using the radiography
source when it got stuck in the unshielded position.  Persons
indirectly involved are usually a larger class, but no less
important.  These include the assistants to the directly involved
persons, supervisors of those persons, maintenance people, health
physics or safety people, warehouse personnel, drivers, and so on.
Also included in persons indirectly involved are the supervisory
and management staff whose responsibilities are connected in any
way with the persons directly or indirectly involved in the
incident or to the facilities, hardware, software, supplies, or
anything else involved in the incident.  This list can be very
long, but the depth of the interviews will vary depending on the
closeness of the person's activities or responsibilities to the
incident.  
Although some of the personnel indirectly involved may not know
much about the incident itself, they may contribute invaluable
information about the morale of the staff, the quality of
management at the facility, the level of training, the degree of
attention to detail normally observed at the facility, audit and
appraisal practices, involvement of consultants and the quality of
their work, the quality of procedures in general, and the degree to
which management insists that personnel adhere to applicable
procedures.  During these interviews, try to get a clear impression
of the extent to which the persons interviewed are aware of the
circumstances directly or indirectly connected to the incident, and
whether their knowledge and awareness are commensurate with their
responsibilities in the organization.
When conducting the interviews, observe the following guidelines:
a. Interview only one or, at most, two people at a time.  A
worker's union representative may be present if the worker
requests it.  However, unless there is a compelling reason,
avoid interviewing people in the presence of the supervisors.
b. Start the interview by stating clearly, but not too
specifically, what you expect to learn from the person. Issue Date: 11/03/00 - 9 - 87103
c. Make it clear that the purpose of the interview is not to
find fault or assign blame, but to learn what happened and if*
there were any contributing factors so that any weaknesses in*
the program may be corrected.  Be very courteous and realize
that the person being interviewed is helping you in your
inspection.
d. Do not interrupt, but ask questions when a statement is not
clear.  Ask questions that elicit useful details rather than
questions that call for yes or no answers.  Also, do not ask
leading questions, i.e., questions that imply the expected*
answer, such as "you did follow proper procedure, didn't
you?".  As long as the person is talking about issues
relevant to the incident, let the person talk.  Keep the*
conversation focused and end the interview as soon as it*
becomes clear that no further useful information can be
obtained.
 e.Make sure to ask open-ended questions that will produce all
the information the person being interviewed is expected to
provide.  The person interviewed may forget something or may
believe that a piece of information is not relevant and may
therefore not state it.  You must be alert to this
selectivity and ask questions to compensate.
 f.Write down all information discussed during the interviews,
such as times, places, recalled conversations, names of
people, equipment, sources, reagents, supplies used,
procedures involved, surveys done, and any information
presented, even if it does not seem to be very relevant at
the time.  Keep the notes clear and orderly so that they may
be used later to reconstruct the information obtained in the
interview.
05.05Facility Inspections.  The purpose of a facility inspection
is to help reconstruct the events leading to the incident, to place
all items and persons involved in proper spatial perspective, and
to attempt to identify any factors, relating to the facility or
equipment, that may have contributed to the incident.  Have a
knowledgeable licensee representative take you on a tour of the
facility.  Ask that person to point out all relevant items involved
in the incident and to show you the path followed by the persons
involved, the layout of equipment and materials at the time of the
incident, and any equipment settings that may be relevant to the
inspection.
Upon arrival at the facility, proceed to make a tour of the*
facility or the area and remind the licensee of the need to provide*
unescorted access (escorted, if need be) to NRC inspectors*
according to the Pre-Inspection Notification (see 5.01j).  Keep in*
mind that you must abide by all of the licensee’s rules and
procedures as provided in their site access training.  Take time to
absorb all detail, and retrace the paths followed by the persons
involved in the incident.  Remember, however, that this is an event
follow-up inspection, and includes only those items that may have
a bearing on the event.87103 - 10 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
During these tours, look for the following, among other things:   *
a. Postings and Access Control:  Are all radiation areas *
properly posted with the correct postings?  Are radiation
postings clearly visible and clean, and do they provide the
necessary information?  Is access to restricted areas
properly controlled?  Are dosimeters issued to the proper
personnel, and are they worn properly? 
b. Equipment and Facilities:  Does the equipment, including *
radiation measuring instruments, look well maintained and
properly handled?  Do instruments have calibration stickers
showing valid calibration dates?  Is shielding provided where
needed?
05.06 Reenactment of the Incident.  Incidents that involved a
complicated series of movements may be difficult to visualize on
the basis of descriptions provided by the licensee.  In this case,
a reenactment may prove very helpful.  The reenactment consists in
having the persons directly involved in the incident go through all
the motions that ultimately led to the incident.  NRC regional *
management and staff should encourage the licensee to perform and *
record on videotape the event reenactment for later and repeat *
viewing.  Prior arrangements and authorizations by the licensee and *
regional management must be made to record the reenactment on
videotape.  In any case, where the licensee records the reenactment *
on videotape, the inspector should obtain a copy of the licensee’s
videotape.
If the equipment or facility involved in the incident is no longer
available, or is unsafe for use in the reenactments, a mockup of
the equipment or facility may be used, if warranted.  A mockup is
a model that is used in place of the equipment during the
reenactment.  The mockup does not have to be an exact replica of
the equipment, but should include the essential features that are
significant in determining the outcome of the incident, such as the
general shape or size, distances, and the weight if carrying the *
item was involved.
Reenactments are very important, and sometimes essential, in cases
where exposures at high dose rates in complicated configurations
were involved.  In such cases, differences of a few seconds in the
estimated exposure times can result in large differences in the
doses assessed for the persons involved.  Reenactments, with time-
and-motion studies, allow refinement of estimates of exposure
times, and also provide the basis for calculating the dose rates at
different phases of the incident by observation of the relative
positions of the personnel and radiation source during the
incident.
If the dose calculations show that any person involved in the
incident was exposed to high doses (i.e., above 20 Rem), regional *
management should contact the appropriate Headquarters management *
to consider the need for cytogenetic studies.  Such studies may
confirm, in some cases, that a high dose was received. (See also MC *
1302, "Action levels for Radiation Exposures and ContaminationIssue Date: 11/03/00 - 11 - 87103
Associated with Events Involving Members of the Public" for
additional guidance.)  *
05.07Documentation.  The documentation needed for the inspection
includes documents that indicate the overall quality of the
licensee's operation, as well as those that are directly related to
the incident.  Obtain for review at least the following documents:
a. Procedures for all activities directly and indirectly related
to the incident.  If applicable, review these procedures and*
determine their adequacy in terms of clarity of presentation,
completeness of information, logical flow of steps to
accomplish the desired end, and clarity of decision points.
If the procedures are found to be weak, determine who wrote
them, the qualifications of those persons, and how the
procedures were tested to ensure that they are correct and
complete.  If availability of procedures appears to be a
problem, verify that there are procedures for all of the*
important activities.  Check on the method used by the*
licensee to keep all procedure copies in the facility
updated, and how controlled and uncontrolled procedures are
used.  Check on the availability of copies of relevant
procedures at the locations where they are supposed to be
used.  Determine the procedure review schedule and verify
that procedures were reviewed on schedule by qualified
personnel.
b. Training and Qualifications Records.  Obtain records of the
qualifications of all persons directly or indirectly
connected with the incident, including technicians, safety
personnel, supervisors, and managers.  Review these records
and verify that all personnel meet at least the minimum
qualification requirements for their positions and are
qualified for their respective functions.  Review training
records and check the training schedules to verify that they
meet minimum training requirements.  Verify that persons
scheduled for training within the past year or two have
attended that training.  Review the qualifications of the
persons who provide the training, and review some of the
lesson plans.  Review some examination questions and some
answers to these questions.
c. Calibration and Quality Control Records.  Check the
calibration records and verify that all equipment that should
have been calibrated was indeed calibrated.  Check that all
instruments scheduled for calibration during the past year or
two have been calibrated at the proper time, using approved
procedures and sources.  Check records of traceability of
calibration sources or instruments.  Verify that personnel
performing the calibrations are properly qualified and
trained for the job.  Check the quality control program and
schedules.  Verify that daily or periodic quality control
checks were made as scheduled, that the results of these
checks were recorded, that instruments that did not pass the
tests were taken out of service, and that these checks are87103 - 12 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
routinely reviewed and signed by a sufficiently high level of
management.
d. Records of the Incident.  Obtain and review all records that
bear directly and indirectly on activities leading to the
incident.  These include the names of persons involved, the
dates and times they entered and left the relevant areas, the
type of dosimetry and the readings of these dosimeters, any
protective clothing worn, and any equipment or sources issued
to them.  Check log books to determine the record of
activities that were performed and that eventually led to the
incident.  Check the records of any radiation surveys that
may have been made before, during, or after the incident.
e. Records of Recovery.  Obtain all records that show the
activities taken to recover from the incident.  Check on whom
initiated corrective actions, who was notified, who responded
and how, who came to the site of the incident, what they did,
and when an investigation was initiated.  Determine the scope
of the licensee's investigation, who was in charge of it and
who was involved, who reviewed and approved the results, and
what corrective actions were recommended and what actions
were actually implemented.
05.08 Review of the Data.  A final reconstruction of the incident *
must now be attempted, and must include all available details. *
Start as far back in time from the incident as may seem relevant to
the ensuing events.  Note where the staff members were at the time,
what they were doing, and what was said.  Proceed forward in this
manner until the time of the incident, and then proceed to the
recovery phase in the same manner.  Note on a time line all
relevant detail, such as what doors were open or closed, what
postings were in the area, instrument readings, room occupancy, *
clothing worn, procedures and equipment used, when equipment was
turned on or off, and what the thoughts of the persons involved
were, relevant to the events that were taking place (e.g., the
technician might have thought that the source was in the shield,
but, in fact it was not).  Try to note why certain actions were
taken and certain others were not.  For example, the technician did
not perform the required survey because he thought the room had
been surveyed by someone else, or because the battery in the survey
instrument was dead, etc.
At the end of this review, the inspector should understand the
incident and relevant factors as well as, if not better than,
anyone on site.  All detail must fall in place, and the flow of
decisions, actions, and responses must be quite clear.  If any gaps
exist, or if any item is not quite clear, return to the notes or
documents, interview more people, or interview again some of those
already interviewed, tour the facility again, or request additional
records.  If the data and events are complex, consider using
charts.  Make up your own system or use standard charting
techniques, such as those used in event and causal factors
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The inspector can refer to NUREG-1303, “Incident Investigation*
Manual,” as a guide on how to collect data.  Although primarily*
used for an Incident Investigation Team, NUREG-1303 is the*
reference document based on inspection experience that provides*
good follow-up information on how to conduct an investigation and*
interview, collect information, write a preliminary notification,*
and prepare a report. *
05.09Establishing Causes.  Most incidents usually have direct
causes, as well as several contributing causes, and one or more
root causes.  Direct causes are the obvious ones that led directly
to the incident.  Contributing causes are those that facilitated,
or did not prevent, the direct cause.  Direct causes usually point
to contributing causes which in turn point to root causes.  A
common direct cause is failure to follow procedures or good
practices.  Failures to follow procedures may have a number of
causes, including, lax discipline, poor management supervision,*
poorly written procedures, procedures that are difficult or
impractical to implement, unavailability of procedures, and so on.
These contributing causes may point to other contributing causes,
such as poor training, poor morale, no management oversight, etc.
For incidents involving a complex interaction of events, or a long
sequence of events, charts may prove to be very useful in
identifying causes.  It should be remembered that causes must be
sought not only for the direct causes, but also for every
contributing factor.  One may view the incident as a series of
incidents, each with its own set of causes, and each leading to, or
failing to prevent, the subsequent action.  All these contributing
causes may have one or a few root causes in common, such as, for
example, an unqualified program manager, or poor management
practices. 
After identifying the causes, express them in a logical hierarchy,
one leading to the next.  State the cause in a manner that suggests
how the action should have proceeded if it had been done properly.
For example, it is better to say that the bottle slipped out of the
technician's hand because the technician was not wearing gloves,
causing his or her hand to be slippery, rather than that the bottle
slipped because the technician's hand was slippery.  The incorrect
action is in this way directly tied to the consequence of that
action, and at the same time clearly implies the correct action
that should have been taken, in this case, to wear gloves.
Finally, the inspector should review the direct and root causes*
against the licensee’s causes and corrective actions to determine*
whether the licensee’s response was appropriate. *
05.10Licensee Briefings.  Once the events and data are properly
ordered and understood, and causes identified, discuss with the*
licensee, at a preestablished time, the status of findings and*
communicate the issues as they develop.  Schedule a brief meeting*
that includes all persons directly and indirectly involved in the
incident.  Ensure that key licensee staff is represented in the*
meeting, and certainly the supervisory and management personnel
directly responsible for the area involved in the incident.  If*
brief meetings are held with the licensee to discuss issues as they*87103 - 14 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
develop, reasonable assurance can be made that the licensee will be *
aware of problematic areas at the time the exit meeting is held. *
Present your findings in a clear, and logical order.  Review your *
understanding of the incident, the sequence of events that led to
it, the persons involved, their actions, and how these actions
contributed to the incident.
After your presentation, which should not last more than 30 minutes
for a complex incident, allow the licensee to comment and to
express disagreement.  Make sure you understand the reasons for the
disagreement, and clearly separate those that stem from differences
of opinion from those that arise out of disagreements on matters of
fact.  For the former, try to understand the licensee's point of
view and note it for later consideration.  For the latter, ensure
that disagreements on fact are resolved, either at the meeting, or
later.  All factual disagreements must be resolved at this stage.
If factual disagreements are extensive, reschedule the meeting and
allow time to review and correct any factual errors.  This phase of
the inspection should not end until all disagreements on matters of
fact are resolved to the extent possible and to your satisfaction.
05.11 Management Briefing.  Keep regional management informed of
the progress of the inspection.  Periodically, summarize the
findings and call the appropriate NRC supervisor, usually the
branch chief, and discuss the findings.  This is especially
important if there are, or are expected to be, controversial issues
arising from the findings.  It is also important to discuss the
merits of any items of apparent noncompliance with regional
management before discussing them with licensee representatives.
Notify regional management of any suspected falsification of
records, providing false information to the NRC, or any other
willful wrongdoing.  If the inspector identifies serious or *
controversial issues which cannot be immediately resolved then NRC *
regional management should consider if their on-site presence is *
warranted. *
05.12 Event Analysis Data.  In accordance with its responsibility
for evaluating and analyzing operational data for material
licensees, NMSS/IMNS collects, reviews, and codes material license *
event data, and maintains a database - the Nuclear Material Events
Database (NMED) - of non-reactor events.  The purpose of reviewing *
operational event data is to identify systemic causes of licensee
problems that are significant to licensee and public health and
safety.  In addition to maintaining this incident database,
NMSS/IMNS also provides computer programs to search the database *
and classify incidents in a variety of ways, depending on the
user's needs.  For example, incidents may be classified by dose
received, body part exposed, type of license, and many other
variables.  To accomplish this goal, NMSS/IMNS must be provided *
with a minimum amount of information for each incident.  This
minimum information is shown in Appendix A in the form of a listing
of the variables needed.  Review the list and record the data for
each variable, as it pertains to the incident.  At this stage of
the inspection, all listed information should be readily available
to you.  If not, attempt to obtain any missing information from theIssue Date: 11/03/00 - 15 - 87103
licensee before the exit meeting.  All documents created related to
the event, such as the inspection report, letters to the licensee
or trustee, etc., should have the NMED event number in a clearly
visible location.  This will ensure that all documents related to
the event are identified in the database.
05.13 Exit Meeting.  The exit meeting is the concluding meeting of
the inspection, and its purpose is to provide the licensee with a
summary of the findings and any items of noncompliance.  Schedule
the meeting for a time just before leaving the site, and leave
immediately after the meeting.  Make sure the meeting is attended
by a sufficiently high level of management, including the RSO.
Make sure the meeting is attended by the highest level of facility
management (e.g., the company president, CEO, or plant manager),
including the RSO.  The exit meeting is your meeting, held at your
request, and you must conduct the meeting.  Open the meeting by
explaining the reasons for coming on site, what you did, and what
were your findings.  Explain what you believe were the causes of
the incident and the program weaknesses that they indicate.
Present your conclusions regarding contributing and root causes.*
List the potential violations of regulatory requirements or license
conditions, and note that these are apparent violations to be
reviewed and approved by regional management.  Ask if everything is
clear and if there are any questions.  Do not enter into any
discussions but note any disagreements and inform the licensee that
you will convey their disagreements to regional management.  Thank
the licensee for their cooperation during the inspection, end the
meeting, and leave site.
05.14Post Inspection Actions.  The inspector will review his or*
her inspection findings with NRC regional management following the*
guidance in MC 1301, "Response to Radioactive Material Incidents*
That Do Not Require Activation of the NRC Incident Response Plan,”*
to determine what follow-up actions must be taken.  The inspector*
should discuss the findings in detail, commensurate with the scope*
of the licensee's program.  Violations, items of concern, and*
unresolved items should be discussed in sufficient depth for*
management to make appropriate decisions regarding enforcement*
actions, referral to other State and Federal agencies, and*
decisions on the scheduling of future inspections of the licensee's*
facility. *
*
Discussion of the inspection findings with licensing staff can be*
particularly useful if the licensee is having its license renewed*
or has recently submitted a license amendment request.  Licensing*
information requested by the licensee should also be discussed with*
the licensing staff. *
*
Inspectors should be aware that NRC has entered into several MOUs,*
with other Federal agencies, that outline agreements on items such*
as exchange of information and evidence in criminal proceedings.*
*
The inspector will prepare a formal report of the results of the*
inspection following the guidance of MC 0610, "Inspection Reports.”*
The findings should be documented in the inspection record, in*
sufficient detail for the reader to determine what requirement was*87103 - 16 - Issue Date: 11/03/00
violated, how it was violated, who violated the requirement, and *
when it was violated.  Copies of all licensee documents needed to *
support the violation should be attached to the inspection record. *
The inspection record should be used to describe what procedures or *
activities were observed and/or demonstrated by the licensee during *
the inspection, and any items of concern identified that were not *
cited as a violation of regulatory requirements. *
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APPENDIX A
INFORMATION NEEDED FOR THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS EVENTS DATABASE *
(NMED) DATABASE *
General Information - All Events
License Number
Additional license numbers, if multiple licenses
Docket number
Licensee's name*
Licensee's city of record*
Licensee's county of record*
Licensee's state of record*
Licensee's telephone number*
City where the event occurred
State where the event occurred
Agreement State (Y/N)
NRC region number
Reportable event?
Date event occurred
Date event reported to NRC or state
Time of event
Was a consultant hired to investigate?
License number of additional involved party
Additional licensee's name
Additional licensee's city of record
Additional licensee's county of record
Additional licensee's state of record
* If a non-licensee is involved, note that fact and enter the marked items. 
General Information - All Medical Misadministrations
Type of misadministration (Part 35)
Dose prescribed
Dose received
Percent under prescribed dose
Percent over prescribed dose
Intended target organ or site
Actual target organ or site
Was patient notified of the misadministration?
Was patient's family notified of the misadministration?
Was the patient's referring physician notified?
Number of people who received a misadministration
Specific Data on Teletherapy Events
Source of radiation prescribed
Source of radiation administered
Model number of teletherapy unit
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of teletherapy unit
Model number of teletherapy unit's source
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of teletherapy unit's source87103, Appendix A A-2 Issue Date: 11/03/00
Teletherapy source activity
Teletherapy source assay date
Teletherapy source radionuclide
Specific Data on Brachytherapy Events
Radionuclide of source prescribed
Radionuclide of source utilized
Activity of source prescribed
Activity of source utilized
Model number of source utilized
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of source utilized
Specific Data on Radiopharmaceutical Events
Radionuclide of pharmaceutical prescribed
Radionuclide of pharmaceutical administered
Activity of pharmaceutical prescribed (mCi)
Activity of pharmaceutical administered (mCi)
Chemical form of pharmaceutical prescribed
Chemical form of pharmaceutical administered
Manufacturer's and/or supplier's name
Specific Data on Radiation Overexposure Events
Number of people who received overexposures
Dose received from the overexposure
Were members of the public overexposed?
Were radiation (occupational) workers overexposed?
Were overexposed persons notified of their exposures?
Source of radiation causing the overexposure
Model number of device causing the overexposure
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of device causing the overexposure
Model number of sealed source causing the overexposure
Manufacturer's name
Radionuclide that caused the overexposure
Activity of the source that caused the overexposure
Assay date of the source
Specific Data on Lost, Abandoned, or Stolen Radioactive Material Events
Model number of the lost or stolen device, instrument, or gauge
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the lost or stolen device, instrument, or gauge
Model number of the lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed source
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the lost, stolen, or abandoned sealed source
Radionuclide in the lost, stolen, or abandoned source
Activity in the lost or stolen source
Assay date of source
Specific Data on Leaking Sealed Source Events
Model number of the leaking sourceIssue Date: 11/03/00 A-3 87103, Appendix A
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the leaking source
Radionuclide of the leaking source
Activity of the leaking source
Assay date of source
Leak test results?
What kind of leak test?
Specific Data on Release of Radioactive Material Events
Radionuclide that was released
Activity of the material released
Specific Data on Radiography Equipment Malfunction or Failure Events
Model number of the equipment that failed or is defective
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the equipment that failed or is defective
Accessory equipment
Manufacturer's name
Specific Data on Damaged Industrial Gauging Device Events
Model number of the damaged gauge housing
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the damaged gauge housing
Model number of the sealed source in the damaged gauge
Manufacturer's name
Serial number of the sealed source in the damaged gauge
Activity of the sealed source
Assay date
Source radionuclide
Specific Data on Consultants
Was a consultant hired?
Consultant's name
Name of consultant's company
Who hired the consultant?
What is the consultant's specialty?
Specific Data on Licensee Corrective Actions
Licensee corrective actions
ENDIssue Date: 11/03/00 B-1 87103, Appendix B
APPENDIX B
GUIDANCE FOR INSPECTION OF MATERIALS
LICENSEES WHO HAVE FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY
Note: The inspector should be aware that NUREG-1556, Vol.15*
“Program-Specific Guidance about changes of control and about*
Bankruptcy Involving Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear*
Material Licenses,”has been issued in draft form.  When this*
draft report is issued in final form, PG 8-11 “NMSS*
Procedures for Reviewing Declarations of Bankruptcy,” will be*
considered superseded and NUREG-1556, Vol. 15 should be used*
as guidance for inspection of materials licensees who have*
filed for bankruptcy. *
Policy and Guidance Directive PG 8-11, “NMSS Procedures for
Reviewing Declarations of Bankruptcy,” requires that, after
receiving a report that a licensee has filed for bankruptcy or that
an involuntary petition has been filed against it, NRC licensing
staff verify that all licensed material possessed by the licensee
is being adequately controlled.  If it is determined that licensed
material may not be adequately controlled, a special inspection
should be conducted.  The special inspection should be conducted in
accordance with this Inspection Procedure.
Policy and Guidance Directive PG 8-11 also requires that a
Bankruptcy Response Team (BRT) be formed.  A BRT consists of
representatives from various NRC offices, whose purpose is to
provide a coordinated response to declarations of bankruptcies,  to*
assess whether there are any current public health and safety*
concerns at the facility, and to determine any impacts the*
bankruptcy could have on licensed operations.  The results of the*
special inspection, if conducted, will assist the BRT with their
duties.
Any steps to secure the site should be taken only after
consultation with the Office of the General Counsel, to ensure that
NRC’s rights to compel the debtor to satisfy its public health,
safety, and environmental obligations, or to pursue any claim
against the assets of the bankruptcy estate would not be
unnecessarily prejudiced.
NRC staff performing the assessment of material control and special
inspection should take into consideration the following guidance:
1. When determining the adequacy of material control and
preparing for an inspection, NRC staff should verify:  
a. the Radiation Safety Officer remains in the position; and
b. access to the licensed material is under positive control
(i.e., the facility has not been abandoned);
and review NRC license files for:  
a. reports of leaking sealed sources;87103, Appendix B B-2 Issue Date: 11/03/00
b. disposition of any identified leaking sealed sources;
c. reports of facility contamination;
d. reports of possible inventory discrepancies; and *
e. history of violations, specifically those related to
performing leak tests, inventories, and facility surveys.
2. While performing the special inspection at the licensee’s
facility, inspectors should review records for:
a. definitive inventory of licensed radioactive material;
b. leak test records;
c. facility surveys; and *
d. shutter checks of fixed gauges (this will help to determine *
the status of the device whether locked out or not). *
3. While performing the special inspection at the licensee’s
facility, inspectors should also:
a. direct an inventory of licensed and unlicensed radioactive
material to be performed, as necessary1;
b. direct leak tests to be performed, as necessary2;
c. direct facility surveys to be performed, as necessary3; and *
d. perform a survey. *
Inspectors should consider whether control of licensed material has *
been maintained and will continue to be maintained, especially in *
cases where operations have ceased or will cease.  Considerations *
of such cases may include: *
*
a. the likelihood of inadvertent releases due to cessation of *
operations; *
b. adequate control of licensed material in the event a closed *
facility is accessed in an unauthorized manner; and *
c. degradation of material control over time in a prolonged *
shutdown condition. *
*
4. Upon completion of the special inspection, the inspector
should provide documentation of the findings to the BRT
leader.
Even though the licensee has filed for bankruptcy, the licensee
remains responsible for all regulatory requirements.  The
inspector‘s role is to make necessary confirmatory measurements.
However, if the licensee has abandoned the material and the trustee
cannot perform these measurements, the inspector shall perform them *
to evaluate the health and safety consequences.
By completing the above actions, all entities involved (licensee,
BRT, trustee, etc.) are aware of the situation and health and
safety issues may be resolved before bankruptcy actions are
completed.
1 If the reviews of files reveal a concern or raise doubts, or if
the licensee has a history of not performing inventories, then an
inventory should be completed.
2 If the reviews of files reveal a concern or raise doubts, or if
the licensee has a history of not performing leak tests, then theIssue Date: 11/03/00 B-3 87103, Appendix B
sealed sources should be leak tested.  In addition, consideration
should be given to leak testing sources that have been in storage
for greater than one year.  The inspector should consider the
former use of the source(s), the current physical condition of the
source(s) (e.g., visible damage, corrosion, etc.), and the past
history of the licensee’s performance of leak testing.
3 If the reviews of files reveal a concern or raise doubts, or if
the licensee has a history of not performing surveys, then a basic
facility survey should be conducted.
END